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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 940724-CA 
v. : 
PAUL G. BREDEHOFT, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION ATTO NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for automobile homicide, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (2) 
(1990) , in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Has defendant demonstrated that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance? 
The trial court's findings of fact on rule 23B remand will not 
be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Since no lower court has ruled on 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim, this Court will treat the 
question as one of law. See State v. Arcruelles. 921 P.2d 439, 440 
(Utah 1996). 
2. Where defendant was lawfully arrested for DUI after an injury 
accident, did the continuous dissipation of his blood alcohol create 
an exigency justifying a warrantless blood draw? 
The trial court's conclusion that exigent circumstances justified 
a warrantless search is reviewed for correctness; underlying factual 
findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. 
City of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1994). 
3. Did defendant preserve his claim that he was not given 
statutory notice of one of the State's experts, where he never 
communicated to the court that ground for his trial objection? 
Resolution of this issue does not require review of any action 
of the trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following 
provisions, the text of which is reproduced in addendum A: 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Code 
Code 
Code 
Code 
Code 
Code 
Code 
Code 
Ann. 
Ann. 
Ann. 
Ann. 
Ann. 
Ann. 
Ann. 
Ann. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
S 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
32A-12-103 (1993) 
32A-12-204 (1993) 
32A-14-101 (1993) 
41-6-44(1) (1993) 
41-6-44.5 (1993) 
76-5-207(2) (1990) 
77-17-13 (1995) 
77-23-4(2) (1990). 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information dated 7 March 1994 as 
follows: 
Count I Criminal homicide, automobile homicide, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207(2) ; 
2 
Count II Driving on denied, suspended, disqualified, or 
revoked license, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227; 
Count III Driving without registration or certificate of 
title, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1303; or in the alternative, 
license plate and registration violation, a class 
C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-la-1305(4); 
Count IV Operation of vehicle without security, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-12a-302. 
(R. 8-11) . Defendant pled guilty to counts II through IV as charged 
(R. 163-64). Count I (automobile homicide) went to trial (R. 177) . 
The State's motion in limine to admit defendant's nine prior 
DUI convictions between 1981 and 1993 and related information was 
denied in part and granted in part (R. 43-44, 129-31). 
On 11 July 1994, the State filed a motion to compel expert 
witnesses (R. 34-35); on 29 July 1994, defendant filed a motion to 
compel notice of experts under Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (a) (b) 
& (2) (R. 81-82) . On 9 August 1994, both parties were ordered "to 
provide to one another a list of expert witnesses, including the 
addresses and phone numbers of those witnesses. Both parties [were] 
further required to provide a brief written statement or report 
prepared by the witness regarding that witness' [s] proposed testimony 
at trial" (R. 128). 
Defendant's motions to suppress the arrest and the results of 
a blood alcohol test were denied and the trial court entered findings 
and conclusions (R. 172-76) . After a six-day trial, a jury returned 
a verdict of guilty as charged (R. 177-85, 292) . 
3 
At sentencing, defense counsel moved the court to reduce 
defendants conviction one degree to a third degree felony pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) (R. 1986). The court denied 
this motion (R. 1992) . The court sentenced defendant to statutory 
terms (misdemeanor terms to run concurrent to each other, but 
consecutive to the felony term) , a $10,000 fine, and full restitution 
(R. 300-03, 307), Defendant timely appealed (R. 319). 
Pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
Court remanded the case with instructions (R. 2109) . The trial court 
entered findings of fact on remand (R. 2125-32). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Facts of the Crime 
Breakdown. In the evening of 1 March 1994, seven Highland High 
School boys were driving the "silver bullet" --a 1977 Chevrolet 
Malibu station wagon -- from a pre-game tailgate party to a Bountiful 
football game (R. 705-707, 711, 756, 831, 844, 865-66, 996, 1018) .2 
At about 7:10 p.m., while driving west on 1-80, they blew a tire 
(R. 708, 711-13, 997) . They exited at the 218t South collector system 
and pulled over into the safety lane to change the tire (R. 709, 
711-713, 758-59, 792, 832-33, 868) . The boys worked on the car until 
about 7:35 p.m., but were unable to fix the tire (R. 714-17, 761) . 
1
 This brief recites facts from the record in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State V, Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989) . 
2
 No alcohol was served at the tailgate party (R. 706, 756, 
865) 
4 
Collision. At this time, Eric Wadley, who was sitting in the 
car, noticed a light fill the interior of the car more than other 
cars had done (R. 768) .3 In fact, a car in the emergency lane was 
accelerating toward the boys1 vehicle from behind, reaching a speed 
of approximately 50 to 65 miles per hour (R. 722, 745-46, 769, 800-01, 
841-42, 875, 1001, 1402).4 
The next thing Eric remembered was "hearing screams from [his] 
friends, . • . grabbing the steering wheel and holding onto it and 
feeling an impact of another car. And then [he] blacked out" (R. 
769) . The car, a red Mustang driven by defendant, never slowed or 
took evasive action, but slammed into the rear of the station wagon, 
knocking it 33 feet and "over the top of the guardrail" (R; 1591, 
723-24, 729-30, 771-72, 841, 877, 946, 1166, 1404-05, 1541)- Two 
of the boys were sitting in the car; others jumped the guardrail 
to safety (R. 843). 
The boys soon realized that one of the boys, Sean Adkins, was 
gone (R. 725, 877, 1004) . They discovered his body on the roadway 
some 113 feet down the road laying face down, but with his eyes open 
(R. 726, 877, 1004-05, 1590). Sean had been struck, probably by 
the station wagon, as he was running away (R. 1407, 1538) . He was 
dead on arrival at LDS Hospital (R. 1043-45). 
3
 The headlights of other cars that passed the boys' car had 
not shined directly into the rearview mirror (R. 783). 
4
 The posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour (R. 1123, 
1405). 
5 
Intoxication. Following the collision, defendant was found sitting 
on the guardrail with a broken finger and a cut lip (R. 843, 878, 
1169). He smelled strongly of alcohol (R. 878, 1166). Defendant 
told an officer on the scene that he had consumed six drinks, mostly 
beer (R. 1167-68) . Defendant was "extremely intoxicated" (R. 1259); 
a later blood test showed his blood alcohol level to be .27 percent 
weight volume (R. 1229-30), a level that would leave many persons 
approaching a comatose state (R. 1248).5 
An ambulance took defendant, Trooper Peterson, and one of the 
boys to a hospital (R. 729-30) . En route defendant repeated, f,0h 
my God, I killed somebody" two or three times (R. 1177, 731) . 
Defendant was examined at the hospital (R. 958-59). His injuries 
were "quite minor" (R. 966) . When asked what had happened, defendant 
responded, "I was driving drunk and I killed a kid" (R. 1823). 
Defendant's trial testimony. At trial, defendant claimed that 
the collision resulted when another car forced him into the emergency 
lane (R. 1944-47) . On cross-examination, he conceded that he had 
consumed alcohol at three different bars, including Uncle Bart's 
and Charlie's Club, where he had gone looking for his friend Doug 
Mickelson (R. 1949-53) . However, he testified that he did not feel 
intoxicated on the night of the homicide (R. 1955-56). 
5
 As a former student in the Dayspring alcohol and drug 
rehabilitation program, defendant was aware of the effects of 
large amounts of alcohol upon his coordination, attention, and 
functioning (R. 1239-42). 
6 
Facts from the Suppression Hearing 
Hearing. Trooper Jeff Peterson was the only witness in the hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress the arrest for lack of probable 
cause and motion to suppress the blood evidence were heard together 
(R. 410-411). 
The accident occurred at 7:35 p.m. and Trooper Peterson arrived 
at about 8:00 p.m. (R. 438-39). He saw defendant "sitting on the 
guardrail on the west side of the collector" (R. 417) . He observed 
"a strong odor of alcoholic beverage" on defendant's breath, "slurred 
speech," "flaccid muscle tone" in defendant fs face, "otosis, or droopy 
eyes," "bloodshot eyes,"and "poor coordination" (isi.). Defendant 
told the trooper that had had had six drinks, " [m]ostly beer" (i£.) . 
Trooper Peterson noticed an open beer can laying on the floor board 
of defendant's wrecked Mustang (R. 418). 
Defendant was led to an ambulance and placed under arrest for 
driving under the influence and, if the injured boy died, automobile 
homicide (R. 419-20, 430, 436). Trooper Peterson's "main concern 
was the body was metabolizing that alcohol"; he wanted to draw blood 
as soon as possible in order to "have an accurate indication of what 
his blood alcohol was at the time of the accident" (R. 437) . Relying 
upon Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757 (1966), he determined 
to draw defendant's blood with or without defendant's consent, and 
advised him that they would be taking his blood (R. 423-24). 
Defendant "produced his arm and gave his blood" (Ad.) . One of the 
ambulance personnel made the blood draw at 8:18 p.m. (R. 431). 
7 
Trooper Peterson did not attempt to obtain a telephonic warrant 
(R. 432) . He believed that at 8 o'clock on a Wednesday night the 
deputy county attorneys "would not be in their office and it would 
be quite an ordeal to get a hold of the county attorney that was 
on call and initiate that telephonic search warrant" (R. 432-33). 
Argument. Defendant argued that the blood test results should 
have been suppressed because Officer Peterson did not obtain a 
telephonic warrant prior to the blood draw (R. 445-50). 
Ruling. The court had no evidence before it of the "exact steps 
and time necessary to get that search warrant" or "as to whether 
or not there was any magistrate available for receipt of a telephonic 
search warrant, " including the availability of recording capabilities 
(R. 455, 458) . The court admitted the blood test results based 
on its oral finding that "there did exist exigent circumstances which* 
obviated the need for a warrant in this matter" (R. 459-60). 
Findings. The court found that "Trooper Jeff Peterson was properly 
concerned about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the possible 
loss or corruption of that evidence, that time was critical in 
obtaining evidence of blood alcohol level, that the offense was 
serious and that the exigent circumstances obviated the need to obtain 
a search warrant" (R. 174-75). It further found "that there was 
no evidence before the Court that a magistrate with the proper 
equipment as required by Utah law was available and prepared to do 
a telephonic search warrant" (R. 175)• 
8 
Facts from the 23B Remand 
Prior relationship. Since 1984, attorney James Mickelson1s 
practice included criminal and private club law (R. 2204) . He knew 
defendant since the late 1970's or early '80's (R. 2197-98). They 
were on a first name basis, had known each other for almost 15 years, 
had dealt with each other in both social and business situations 
(R. 2202) . Mr. Mickelson even represented defendant on one DUI case 
in the 1980's (R. 2198-99). Defendant was also on a first-name 
basis with Mr. Mickelsonfs parents and his then wife (R. 2200) . 
Defendant knew that Uncle Bart's and Charlie's Club were Mickelson 
family operations, and had even performed janitorial and other 
services for them on a contractual basis (R. 2198-2200). 
Drinking establishments. Charlie's Club and Uncle Bart's are 
non-profit private clubs that serve liquor (R. 2138, 2143) . In 1994, 
Mr. Mickelson was an officer anH trustee of the clubs; the other 
officers and trustee were all his family members (R. 2139, 2142, 
2144). Club Management, Inc., a for-profit corporation, manages 
Charlie's Club and is paid management fees (R. 2139-40, 2190) . Mr. 
Mickelson was a 50% owner, an officer, and a director of Club 
Management, Inc.; the other officers were all his family members 
(R. 2140, 2144-45, 2172) . Mr. Mickelson did not receive any money 
from Club Management, Inc. directly, such as in the form of dividends 
(R. 2140, 2191) . Revenue generated by these three entities is his 
parents' sole livelihood (R. 2246). 
9 
Mr. Mickelson was the registered agent for all three corporations 
and advised them on corporate and regulatory issues, including during 
the period of this case (R. 2154, 2165, 2172, 2184). He may have 
received attorney's fees for his work (R. 2139). However, he did 
not represent them at any time in any matter connected with the 
homicide (R. 2164, 2184). Nor did he represent any employees of 
the entities in any capacity (R. 2174). 
Attorney-client discussions. After defendant committed the 
homicide, a mutual friend requested that Mr. Mickelson visit defendant 
in jail, which he did (R. 2162) . Defendant was "more than just 
a simple client" for Mr. Mickelson (R. 2202) . Because of their prior 
relationship, Mr. Mickelson considered their relationship one of 
personal as well as professional trust (R. 2202) . 
Mr. Mickelson twice discussed with defendant the possibility 
that civil claims could be asserted against them both (R. 2163-64, 
2167-71). The first discussion occurred between the homicide and 
the preliminary hearing (R. 2167). Mr. Mickelson discussed the 
potential for conflict arising out of a possible future civil action 
(R. 2168). He considered the likelihood of criminal liability on 
the part of the business entities to be "near zero" (R. 216P). 
He explained that, because of his ties to the clubs, there was 
a possibility that unconsciously he might do or not do something 
that would affect his representation (R. 2171, 2179) . He continued, 
"^m loyal to you[;] the clubs . . . admit that you were in there 
drinking and that--but ... my interest was in defending [defendant] 
and I didn't think I would be affected by it" (R. 2171). 
10 
Before the second discussion, Mr. Mickelson reviewed the Rules 
of Professional Conduct and discussed the matter with attorneys in 
his office (R. 2181) . During his discussion with defendant, defendant 
said that he understood the issue and asked Mr. Mickelson to continue 
to represent him (R. 2203-04). Mr. Mickelson suggested that he 
consult with another attorney, but defendant said he felt comfortable 
with Mr. Mickelson (R. 2204; see also R. 2179-80). 
In both discussions, Mr. Mickelson told defendant that he was 
involved with the clubs, but defendant was already aware of that 
fact (R. 2170, 2182) . Mr. Mickelson thus explained that there would 
be a conflict of interest if the victim's parents named both the 
private clubs and defendant in a civil suit (R. 2170). 
Mr. Mickelson did not believe that he had an actual conflict 
in this case, only that the possibility of a potential conflict 
existed (R. 2164). Accordingly, he made no disclosures to the 
magistrate or judge and prepared no written waiver (R. 2163-64). 
His notes concerning conflicts from one of the discussions with 
defendant were not available at the 2—~ 23B hearing (R. 2166-67) .6 
From 1984 to 1996, Mr. Mickelson1 s practice included incorporating 
private clubs and related regulatory matters (R. 2147-48). He was 
aware of the Dram Shop Act and that the clubs involved in this case 
6
 Mr. Mickelson did take notes of his discussion with 
defendant of the conflict of interest issue during one of their 
meetings (R. 2166-67, 2217-18). These notes were placed in 
defendant's file (R. 2218). However, Mr. Mickelson later 
released the file to the Salt Lake Legal Defenders for copying 
(R. 2166-67, 2219). After recovering the file from LDA, Mr. 
Mickelson went through it page by page, but has not been able to 
find those notes (R. 2166-67) 
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faced potential civil liability for serving liquor to defendant 
on 1 March 1994 (R. 2147, 2158). He believed that a civil action 
would entail a determination of comparative fault, although he did 
not consider himself to have any exposure (R. 2159). 
Civil action. In November 1994, the parents of defendant's victim 
filed a civil action against Uncle Bart's, Charley's Club# Club 
Management, Inc., James Mickelson, Doug Mi eke 1 son (James's father) , 
Paul Bredehoft, and others (R. 2149-50, Ex. D-6) . James Mickelson 
never believed that he or any members of his family had any personal 
liability (R. 2195-97) , and they were in fact dismissed out of the 
case before it went to trial (R. 2152, 2195-97). 
Criminal exposure. In his practice, Mr. Mickelson reviews all 
the publications from the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
that identify cases and types of liquor violations (R. 2208). 
Nevertheless, he was not aware of Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1990) , 
relating to vicarious criminal liability imposed upon an officer 
of a corporation operating a licensed club where a criminal violation 
occurs (R. 21F6) . He was unaware of any case where the prosecution 
sought to use the testimony of the person charged with DUI against 
the establishment that served the alcohol (R. 2210), nor did he 
believe a prosecutor would make a deal with a felony defendant in 
order to bring misdemeanor charges against the taverns (R. 2210-11) . 
No plea bargain. Three to five times, Mr. Mickelson broached 
the subject of a plea bargain with prosecutors (R. 2173, 2211). 
However, in the screening process the County Attorney's office had 
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determined that this case would not be plea bargained because of 
defendant's prior history (R. 2215). In addition, the victim had 
died and the case had received extensive publicity (R. 2214-15). 
Consequently, the prosecutors never showed any willingness to consider 
a plea bargain or to compromise the case in any way (R. 2173, 2215, 
2217) . Even when it briefly appeared that a mistrial might eventuate, 
prosecutors rebuffed Mr. Mickelson's plea offer, stating, ,fWe!ll 
take our chances here, we're not pleading itM (R. 2216-17). 
Since Mr. Mickelson had "never heard of a club being charged 
on these kinds of facts with . . . criminal conduct" he never "made 
any offers about testimony or information that [defendant] may have 
had relating to misconduct or possible misconduct by the bars" (R. 
2173). Mr. Mickelson testified without contradiction that, had he 
"received any evidence that there was any possible conduct on the 
part of the bars that would benefit [defendant, he] would have 
immediately withdrawn" (R. 2174). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. James Mickelson did have ties to the clubs where defendant 
had been drinking. However, they created at most a hypothetical 
conflict, not an actual one. Nor did they affect his performance 
at trial. Defendant's choices reflect thoughtful trial strategy. 
2. Because defendant was lawfully arrested, the dissipation 
of his blood alcohol created an exigency justifying the warrantless 
blood draw. Utah and foreign cases agree that the State is not 
required to prove the unavailability of a telephonic warrant. 
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3. Defendant failed to preserve below his claim that Dr. 
Middleton's testimony violates the expert witness notice statute. 
The record is clear that, while defendant may have intended this 
objection, the trial court reasonably did not understand defendant 
to be asserting this ground. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT AN ACTUAL CONFLICT 
OF INTEREST ADVERSELY AFFECTED HIS LAWYER'S PERFORMANCE 
Defendant claims to have been denied effective assistance of 
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment because his trial 
counsel, James Mickelson, labored under an actual conflict of 
interest. Br. of Aplt. at 10-ll.7 
This conflict of interest arose, defendant argues, because two. 
of the clubs that served him liquor before the homicide were owned 
and operated by Mickelson family members, including Mr. Mickelson 
himself. Br. Aplt. at 11. 
7
 Although defendant nominally refers to article I, section 
12 of the Utah Constitution, B£& Br. Aplt. at 1, 8, 10, 26, he 
offers no separate analysis. Accordingly, no independent state 
constitutional claim is before this Court, fififi State v. Laffertv. 
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) (declining to engage in state 
constitutional analysis where no argument for different analyses 
under the state and federal constitutions was briefed), habeas 
corpus granted on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook. 949 F.2d 1546 
(10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992); State v. 
Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 927 n.13 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to 
reach state constitutional challenge absent independent state 
constitutional analysis). 
14 
A. To prevail/ defendant must prove that an actual conflict 
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 
Ineffectiveness claims are two-pronged. "First, the defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was deficient"; second, "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result 
is reliable." Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential." XsL at 689. 
For purposes of assessing prejudice, ineffectiveness claims 
fall into three categories: 
1. First are cases of "complete denial of counsel." United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) . This category includes 
cases where "counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from 
assisting the accused during a critical stage of the rr:.. -ding," 
or where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case 
to meaningful adversarial testing." ifl. at 659, 659 n.25. In such 
cases, prejudice is presumed. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 692. 
2. "One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, 
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. " Id. These are cases 
where "counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest." Id. 
The rule for these cases "is not quite the per se rule of prejudice" 
applied in cases of the first category. Id. 
"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that 
counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that !an 
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actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's 
performance. 'ff Id- (quoting Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 
(1980)).8 "Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest 
actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not 
demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief." Cuvler. 446 U.S. 
at 349-50 (finding no actual conflict) . "But until a defendant shows 
that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has 
not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of 
ineffective assistance"; "the possibility of conflict is insufficient 
to impugn a criminal conviction fl !£. at 350. 
3. "Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness 
claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject 
to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove 
prejudice, " that is, a "reasonable probability" of a different result. 
StricKlanfl, 466 U.S. at 693-94. 
Defendant here asserts a claim of the second type. Accordingly, 
in order to prevail on appeal he must demonstrate that Mr. Mickelson 
"actively represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected" Mr. Mickelson1 s performance." 
Cuvler. 446 U.S. at 349-50. 
8
 Prejudice is presumed without more where a defendant 
objects at trial to a conflict of interest but the trial court 
does not grant an opportunity to show that the potential conflict 
impermissibly imperils the right to a fair trial. Cuyler, 446 
U.S. at 348; State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App. 1990). 
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B. Any conflict of interest was hypothetical, not actual. 
In arguing that defendant labored under an actual conflict of 
interest, defendant relies on three theories: (1) Mr. Mickelson and 
his family faced potential criminal liability for the homicide 
committed by defendant; (2) Mr. Mickelson and his family faced 
potential civil liability for the homicide committed by defendant; 
and (3) Mr. Mickelson was a potential witness at defendant's criminal 
trial. See Br. Aplt. at 11, 17. 
"In order to show an actual conflict of interest existed, a 
defendant must point to specific instances in the record to suggest 
an actual conflict or impairment of his or her interests." Webb, 
790 P.2d at 75 (citations omitted) ; Edens v. Hannicran, 87 F.3d 1109, 
1113 (10th Cir. 1996) (defendant must "show specific instances of 
an actual conflict adverse to his interests") (citations omitted)*. 
"There is no violation where the conflict is irrelevant or merely 
hypothetical; there must be an actual, significant conflict." Webb, 
790 P.2d at 75 (citations omitted) . If an attorney was not forced 
to choose between possible alternative courses of actions, "the 
conflict remained hypothetical." Xfi. (citations omitted). Thus, 
where a single attorney represents co-defendants in a criminal case, 
" [a]n actual conflict of interest exists when the respective defenses 
of multiple defendants are inconsistent, i.e., if introduction of 
probative evidence or plausible arguments that would significantly 
benefit one defendant would damage the defense of another defendant 
whom the same counsel is representing." !£. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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,fUntil a defendant shows an actual conflict, he has not established 
the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." 
Id- at 76 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, Mr. Mickelson never faced the dilemma of choosing between 
alternative courses of action. No evidence that would benefit the 
clubs but damage defendant, or vice versa, ever arose, and the 
interests of the clubs and defendant were consistent. ££. People 
v. Richardson. 287 N.E.2d 517, 518 (111. App. 1972) (finding conflict 
where attorney's contingent fee in dramshop action on behalf of 
children of deceased wife increased with sentence imposed on husband 
whom attorney represented in criminal case). Accordingly, any 
conflict of interest Mr. Mickelson labored under was hypothetical 
and therefore insufficient to support a Sixth Amendment claim. 
1 . In the unlikely event that the Mickelson* and their 
businesses had criminal exposure, their interests 
aligned with defendant's. 
It is doubtful that any member of the Mickelson family faced 
criminal liability as a result of defendant's homicidal driving. 
An obscure criminal statute in Title 32A of the Utah Code appears 
to impose prima facie vicarious criminal liability on the "occupant" 
of a licensed club for the criminal acts of the employees. S&& Utah 
Code Ann. § 32A-12-103 (1) (1993) .* Furnishing alcohol to an 
apparently intoxicated person is such an act. StSS. section 32A-12-204. 
If the violation is committed by a corporation or association, 
9
 The term "occupant" is not defined in the Utah Code or 
Utah Administrative Code. 
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"the officer or agent of the corporation or association in charge 
of the premises in which the offense is committed" is prima facie 
liable for the offense committed. Section 32A-12-103 (2) . Violation 
of this title is a class B misdemeanor. Section 32A-12-104. 
However, defendant has not shown that these sections would have 
created prima facie criminal exposure for Mr. Mickelson or his family 
members. The record does not demonstrate that any member of the 
Mickelson family was the "occupant" of either of the clubs the evening 
of the homicide. Moreover, since the clubs were owned and operated 
by corporations, any offense would seem to have been "committed by 
a corporation." The owners and officers of these corporations were 
Mickelson family members; however, the businesses employed about 
30 other people as well (R. 2246) . The record does not establish 
that any Mickelson family member was "the officer or agent of the 
corporation or association in charge of the premises in which the 
offense fwasl committed" that night. Section 32A-12-103 (2) (emphasis 
added).10 Although Mr. Mickelson1 s father, Doug Mickelson, did manage 
the "day-to-day operations of Charlie's Club" (R. 2198) , defendant 
testified that Doug Mickelson was not at the club when he drank there 
on 1 March 1994 (R. 1952-53) . Accordingly, this Court cannot find 
10
 Defendant's assertion that this section "provides for 
criminal liability for officers and agents of a corporation when 
an offense occurs," Br. Aplt. at 13, is overbroad. The section 
applies only to "the officer or agent of the corporation or 
association in charge of the premises in which the offense is 
committed." Section 32A-12-103(2) (emphasis added). Even then, 
the section provides only that such a person is "prima facie 
considered a party to the offense . . . " Is£. 
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that Mr. Mickelson or his family members faced even prima facie 
criminal liability for defendant's homicidal driving on 1 March 1994. 
Moreover, Mr. Mickelson was not aware of these statutes, did 
not "see any criminal liability here on these clubs' parts," and 
saw no indication that prosecutors had "any desire to seek criminal 
liability on behalf of the clubs" (R. 2156, 2171, 2179, 2182). 
Defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, holding 
that an ineffectiveness claim based on an actual conflict of interest 
is supported by a conflict of which the attorney is unaware. 
Finally, if the clubs had been exposed to any criminal liability, 
and if they or Mr. Mickelson had known of it, their interest would 
have been consistent with defendant's. The clubs' interest would 
have been in establishing that defendant was not "apparently under 
the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages." Section 32A-12-
204. This was also defendant's interest. He could not alter his 
blood alcohol level. However, the jury was more likely to believe 
that he was forced into the emergency lane by another car if, as 
Charlie's Club bartender Gloria Anderson testified, he "appeared 
just normal, " was "talking straight, " "slurring no words, " and walking 
normally when he left the club (R. 1639-44). 
Thus, the testimony of Gloria Anderson benefitted both defendant 
and the clubs. Mr. Mickelson was not faced with the choice of 
benefitting one at the expense of the other. Any conflict of interest 
he suffered was thus not actual, but hypothetical only. 
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2. Since the fault of dramshops and drunk drivers 
is never compared, their interests are aligned 
in civil actions tinder the Dramshop Act. 
One who serves alcohol to a person whom the server "knew or 
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence 
of intoxicating alcoholic beverages" is liable civilly for injuries 
resulting from the intoxication. Section 32A-14-101 (1) (c) (1994) . 
The server's employer is vicariously liable. Section 32A-14-101 (2) . 
Any civil liability here was limited to liability of the 
corporations for the acts of their employees. The clubs did not 
deny defendant's presence on the date of the homicide (R. 2182). 
Defendant has never proven that any server was employed by an 
individual, and in fact the record intimates that the servers were 
employed by the corporate entities (R. 2246-47) . Assuming arguendo 
that club employees served defendant when they knew or should have 
known he was intoxicated, they would be liable to his victims and 
their corporate employers would be vicariously liable. Mr. Mickelson 
believed at the time that neither he nor any member of his family 
would be civilly liable; this belief was subsequently borne out when 
they were all dismissed from the civil action (R. 2152, 2159, 2195-
97) . Accordingly, any possible conflict was limited to the clubs 
and did not extend to Mr. Mickelson or his family members personally. 
However, the clubs' interest would have been consistent with 
defendant's interest in a civil trial. The only context in which 
defendant's interest and the clubs' interest would appear to clash 
is in assessing comparative fault. However, the Dramshop Act makes 
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"dramshop owners strictly liable without regard to the finding of 
fault, wrongful intent, or negligent conduct on their part.,f Reeves 
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991). Hence, ffthe doctrine 
of comparative negligence does not have application to dramshop 
defendants." !£. Nevertheless, a dramshop defendant is entitled 
to have the jury compare the negligence of the drunk driver against 
the negligence of the plaintiff, and to receive a commensurate 
reduction in the damages assessed against it. is|. at 117-18. Hence, 
the interest of the dramshop and the interest of the drunk driver 
are aligned, not opposed, in the civil context. 
Accordingly, under Reeves v. Gentile no actual conflict of 
interest arose from the possibility of a future civil action against 
both defendant and the Mickelson family businesses. 
3. Defendant cites no personal information within 
counsel's knowledge that would have made him a 
potential witness at defendant's trial* 
Defendant's assertion that Mr. Mickelson's "knowledge of the 
policies at the clubs could have made him a witness at Mr. Bredehoft' s 
trial," Br. Aplt. at 17, fails on the record* Mr. Mickelson had 
no "personal information regarding the facts underlying his client! s 
charges." Statg Vt Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah App. 1991) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Government of Virgin 
Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3rd Cir. 1984)). Defendant has 
identified no fact within Mr. Mickelson1s knowledge even remotely 
relevant to the criminal trial. Nothing suggests that Mr. Mickelson 
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was present at Charlie's Club or Uncle Bart's while defendant was 
drinking there, nor was he present at the scene of the homicide. 
Consequently, no finding of actual conflict of interest can 
rest on the theory that counsel was a potential trial witness. 
C. Any possible conflict did not adversely affect counsel's 
performance. 
Defendant claims that Man actual conflict adversely affected 
Mr. Mickelson's performance." Br. Aplt. at 25 (capitalization 
removed) . Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Mickelson labored under 
an actual conflict of interest, it did not adversely affect his 
performance. 
In reviewing such a claim in Webb, this Court considered factors 
such as (1) whether a defense strategy was prompted by a desire or 
effort to favor another at the client's expense; (2) whether counsel 
had viable defense options to pursue; (3/ whether other reasonably 
competent counsel would have chosen a different defense strategy; 
(4) whether a different strategy would have benefitted defendant; 
and (5) whether a tactical reason underlay counsel's action. Webb, 
790 P.2d at 76. 
1. No plea bargain was possible. 
That Mr. Mickelson did not attempt to trade defendant's testimony 
against the Mickelson family and their businesses for charging or 
sentencing concessions is not an adverse effect of a conflict of 
interest as defendant claims. S£SL Br. Aplt. at 25. 
First of all, no plea bargain of any description was possible 
in this case. The prosecutors flatly refused to consider a plea 
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bargain. In the screening process the County Attorney's office had 
already determined that this case would not be plea bargained because 
of defendant's prior history (R. 2215). In addition, the victim 
had died and the case had received extensive publicity (R. 2114-15) . 
Consequently, at no time did the prosecutors give any indication 
that they would consider a plea bargain or be willing to compromise 
the case in any way (R. 2173, 2215, 2217). Failure to achieve a 
plea bargain is not an adverse effect attributable to an actual 
conflict of interest where prosecutors are unwilling to bargain. 
See Buroer v. Kemp. 483 U.S. 776, 786-87 (1987). 
In addition, the offer defendant now advocates is unrealistic. 
On these facts, experienced prosecutors would never reduce a second 
degree felony charge against the actual perpetrator of the homicide 
in exchange for his testimony against the dramshops or their owners 
on vicarious-liability class B misdemeanor charges.11 
Finally, counsel's decision to forego making such an offer was 
not motivated by favoritism. Mr. Mickelson was unaware of section 
32A-12-103. He believed, and correctly so, that neither he nor any 
member of his family had any criminal exposure. 
This was not a case like Edens v. Hanniaan. fiUE£&. There, an 
attorney named Schultz represented co-defendants Edens and Lemons 
in a murder case. 87 F.3d at 1112. Edens was the less culpable, 
11
 Furthermore, the offer to testify against club personnel 
would have been an admission of defendant's further guilt. In 
order to testify that they unlawfully sold an alcoholic beverage 
to an intoxicated person, see section 32A-12-204, defendant would 
have had to testify that he was intoxicated, making his purchase 
of the beverage equally unlawful. See Section 32A-12-210. 
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but Lemons' family paid Schultz ' s fees. Id. at 1112, 1117. "Edens' 
only defense was in conflict with the defense presented for Lemons." 
l£l. at 1116. In fact, Schultz actually told Lemons that "it would 
be advantageous to have Edens as a codefendant because Edens could 
not then be used as a state1 s witness against Lemons." Id. Schultz 
called Lemons to testify, but never cross-examined him on Edens1 
behalf. I£. at 1117. Although Edens wanted to testify, Schultz 
told him he could not. Id- Although Edens was the less culpable 
defendant, the attorney refused to pursue a plea bargain on his behalf 
"because such an arrangement would have been in direct conflict with 
Lemons1 defense." I£. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that "Schultz labored under an actual conflict of interest which 
adversely affected his representation of Edens." Id- at 1118. 
2. Defendant's only viable defense required that he 
testify. 
Mr. Mickelson1 s decision to call defendant to testify was based 
on sound trial strategy. In fact, ne had no plausible option except 
to call defendant. ££. Webb, 790 P.2d at 76. 
Mr. Mickelson testified that the central problem facing the 
defense was explaining why defendant was driving in the emergency 
lane (R. 2237) . Defendant told Mr. Mickelson that there was "another 
vehicle which had forced him into the emergency lane" (R. 2236). 
Counsel accordingly made the strategic choice to run a defense based 
on the "sudden emergency" doctrine (R. 2235).12 This required 
12
 £££ teg Vt Mitchell Funeral Ifome ftnfryfl»nc3 Ssrvt* eoe 
(continued...) 
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defendant to testify (R. 2239). Mr. Mickelson carefully explained 
to defendant "what would happen when the prosecutor cross-examined 
him" and defendant agreed to take the stand (R. 2240) . 
Defendant testified that a car crowded him out of his lane, 
forcing him into the emergency lane in order to avoid being hit (R. 
1944-45). He claimed that as he was checking his blind spot and 
mirrors, he looked up and saw "some movementw and "swerved to the 
lane of travel and there was, I don't know, an impact" (R. 1946) . 
Obviously, a sound tactical reason underlay counsel's 
recommendation. ££. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76. Defendant does not suggest 
any plausible defense that unconf licted counsel could have mounted 
without the use of defendant's testimony or that held the promise 
of a better result for defendant. ££. id- In sum, the decision 
that defendant testify was "made for any number of legitimate tactical 
reasons." State v. Newman, 928 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah App. 1996), 
Mr. Mickelson's decision was not prompted by a desire to favor 
another at the client's expense. ££. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76. Far 
from benefitting the clubs, as defendant now suggests, calling 
defendant to testify had if anything the potential to harm Mr. 
Mickelson's family businesses (R. 2243) . In the rule 23B hearing, 
Mr. Mickelson testified: 
Prior to Paul • s testimony, I don11 think anybody knew where 
Paul had been drinking at, and therefore, putting him on 
the stand and in a potential cross-examination, I believed 
that the prosecutor . . . would inquire where he'd been 
12
 (• • .continued) 
P.2d 259, 261 (Utah 1980) (discussing sudden emergency 
doctrine). 
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drinking, how much he drank, so to do so would be adversely 
against the interest of . . . Charlie1s and Bartfs. 
(R. 2243). Mr. Mickelson concluded at trial that his belief was 
correct, because "when Paul testified on the stand as to where he 
had been, every investigator for the County Attorney • s Office sitting 
in this courtroom picked up theit cell phones and made calls 
immediately to find out about those places" (R. 2244) . 
Defendant argues that his trial testimony, "while favorable 
to Mr. Mickelson's drinking establishments, was subjected to 
devastating rebuttal." Br. Aplt. at 20. On the contrary, as Mr. 
Mickelson testified without contradiction, defendant's best defense 
at trial was to explain why he was in the emergency lane, and his 
only means of establishing that defense was to take the stand. 
Defendant correctly asserts that his testimony opened the door 
to rebuttal testimony that defendant told a physician, "I was driving 
drunk and I killed a kid." see Br. Aplt. at 20 (citing R. 1823) . 
However, two witnesses had already testified that, en route to the 
hospital, defendant repeated, "Oh my God, I killed somebody" two 
or three times (R. 1177; see also R. 731) . And with a blood alcohol 
level of .27, there was no question that defendant was driving drunk. 
Considering the lack of plausible alternatives and the potential 
harm to the clubs, Mr. Mickelson's advice to defendant to take the 
stand proves only that counsel acted in defendant's best interest 
without regard to any impact on the clubs. 
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3. Counsel called a bartender who testified that she 
served defendant alcohol at Charlie's Club. 
Defendant argues that Mr. Mickelson breached his duty of loyalty 
to defendant because he "failed to investigate possible wrongdoing 
by the clubs and their employees. " Br. Aplt. at 19. Defendant claims 
that the reason for this conduct is wobvious: Mr. Mickelson did not 
want to find anything that would point to liability on the part of 
the clubs# their managers, officers and agents." id. 
This argument ignores the trial record. According to defendantf s 
testimony, his last stop before the 1 March 1994 homicide was 
Charlie's Club (R. 1952-53). He testified that after consuming 
two drinks there he "didn't feel intoxicated" and that his responses 
and perceptions were normal (R. 1953-56) . To corroborate defendant's 
testimony, Mr. Mickelson called Gloria Anderson, the Charlie's Club 
employee who waited on defendant that evening (R. 1641-42). Ms. 
Anderson, who had been formally trained to determine when someone 
was intoxicated, testified that when defendant left the club he did 
not appear to be intoxicated (R. 1640-43). 
Moreover, no competent defense lawyer would have introduced 
evidence of "wrongdoing by the clubs and their employees. " Testimony 
that the clubs continued to serve defendant alcohol after he was 
obviously intoxicated would have buttressed the State' s claim that 
defendant was too intoxicated to drive safely. 
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4. Three incidental references to counsel's father 
at trial were insignificant. 
Defendant points to three incidental references to Doug Mickelson 
in the trial testimony of defendant and Gloria Anderson as evidence 
of an adverse effect on counsel's trial performance. Br. Aplt. at 
25-26 (citing R. 1951-53, 1649, 1655). These references, he argues, 
may have suggested to the jury that counsel and client were "somehow 
in cahoots," thereby undermining Mr. Mickelson's credibility. Id. 
at 26. 
In the context of a trial record of nearly 2,000 pages, the 
references of which defendant complains were insignificant. No 
connection was ever drawn between Doug and James Mickelson; Doug 
was mentioned only in passing as the person defendant was looking 
for in the bars; Mickelson is a common enough name that the identity 
of names might have been coincidental; and, considering the nature 
of the charge, it is unlikely that the jury would have attributed 
any criminal involvement to counsel. If the jury noticed the name 
and speculated on it, the most likely inference is wholly innocent: 
defendant hired his friend's son to represent him. 
5 . Counsel actively advocated for defendant at trial . 
The trial record as a whole refutes defendant's claim of adverse 
impact. Counsel was no potted plant. He objected during the 
prosecutors' direct examinations (see, e.g.. R. 1245-47, 1295, 1306-
08, 1315-16, 1505, 1507, 1509), including a "vigorous objection" 
to a critical question asked of defendant on cross-examination 
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(R. 1631) ; he cross-examined prosecution witnesses thoroughly (see, 
e.g. . R. 1347-63, 1418-88, 1543-82); he introduced 19 exhibits (R. 
297-98) ; he pursued, mid-trial, a suggestion of juror bias (R. 2076-
95) ; he credibly argued for dismissal of the charges at the conclusion 
of the State's case (R. 1610-13); he gave an extensive opening 
statement at the outset of the defense case (R. 1617-29) ; he called 
several witnesses, including an accident reconstructionist (R. 1656-
59, 1783) ; he gave a lengthy closing argument that was as persuasive 
as the facts of the case permitted (R. 1883-1917) ; and he preserved 
the search issue that defendant now urges on appeal (R. 445-50). 
But the clearest proof that Mr. Mickelson was not affected by 
his connection to the clubs is that he affirmatively exposed their 
identities by calling defendant testify (see R. 1943-44, 1949-53) . 
If any conflict of loyalty did exist, counsel resolved it in favor 
of defendant at the clubs1 expense. 
D. State v. Johnson is easily distinguishable. 
Defendant relies on State v. Johnson. Br. Aplt. at 15-17, 21-22, 
24-25. As the lone Utah case of a criminal defense attorney charged 
with a conflict between his client's interest and his own, Johnson 
seems relevant. However, it is readily distinguishable. 
Attorney Joseph Bottum represented Johnson against a securities 
fraud charge. Johnson. 823 P.2d at 486. The State had information 
that Bottum had substantial knowledge of, and had directly 
participated in, one of the transactions at issue. 13. It intended 
to present this evidence at trial, and possibly call Bottum as a 
witness. Id. The State brought this matter before the trial court. 
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Id. Bottum denied all involvement and repeatedly stated that he 
"was at a loss to understand what they're talking about." id. at 
487, At trial, the State's chief witness explained the fraudulent 
stock scheme and Bottumfs role in it. Id. 
This Court held that, because "Bottum was implicated as a 
coconspirator,,f he "had an interest in exonerating himself which 
was not consistent with defending his client.11 I£. at 490. Also, 
his integrity and credibility as defense counsel were eroded by the 
accusations. ifl. Hence, Bottum failed to call defendant as a 
witness, failed to call himself as a witness, and failed to object 
to the prosecutor's closing argument. 1£. at 490, 490 n.3. The 
court therefore found a Sixth Amendment violation. Xs|. at 491. 
In contrast, Mr. Mickelson here had no personal knowledge 
(substantial or otherwise) of the facts underlying the charges; did 
not conspire with his client to commit any crime; did not misrepresent 
the level of his involvement to the court; had no testimony to 
contribute at trial; had no criminal exposure; was not discredited 
before the jury by accusations of complicity; did not inadequately 
cross-examine any prosecution witness; did not silence his client 
for fear of implicating himself; and did not fail to object to 
prosecutor comments in closing. 
Defendant has not demonstrated that his lawyer "actively 
represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 392 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Accordingly, his Sixth Amendment claim fails. 
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POINT II 
BECAUSE DEPENDANT WAS LAWFULLY ARRESTED FOR DRUNK DRIVING, 
THE CONTINUOUS DISSIPATION OF HIS BLOOD ALCOHOL CREATED 
AN EXIGENCY JUSTIFYING THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW 
Defendant claims that, because police did not attempt to obtain 
a telephonic warrant before drawing his blood, the trial court erred 
in finding that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement applied. Br. Aplt. at 28-29. 
Pursuant to Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 
1994) , the trial court concluded that "destruction of blood alcohol 
evidence can constitute an exigent circumstance," and that "the 
officer is not required to show an inability to obtain a telephonic 
search warrant in addition to demonstration of exigent circumstances" 
(R. 174). £g£ Utah Code Ann. §77-23-4 (1990) . 
The court found that Trooper Peterson "was properly concerned-
about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the possible loss or 
corruption of that evidence, that time was critical in obtaining 
evidence of blood alcohol level, that the offense was serious and 
that the exigent circumstances obviated the need to obtain a search 
warrant" and "that there was no evidence before the Court that a 
magistrate with the proper equipment as required by Utah law was 
available and prepared to do a telephonic search warrant" (R. 174-75) . 
A. Dissipation of blood alcohol satisfies the exigency 
requirement for a warrantless blood draw in this 
context. 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and 
seizures, only those that are unreasonable." Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
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Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citations omitted). 
"What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding 
the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself." 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez. 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) 
(citations omitted) . Thus, the constitutionality of government action 
"is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests." Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 654 (1979). 
In most criminal cases, this balance is struck "in favor of 
the procedures described by tha Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment." Skinner. 489 U.S. at 619. However, courts have 
recognized exceptions to this rule "when special needs, beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable." J&. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
"When faced with such special needs, [the Court has] not hesitated 
to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the 
practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the 
particular context." JjJ, Examples include post-accident blood tests 
of railway workers, !£. at 624, sobriety checkpoints, Michigan Deot. 
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), life-threatening 
emergencies, Warden yf Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967), and blood 
tests of drunk drivers, Schmerberv. California. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) . 
" [T]he intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant." 
Skinner. 489 U.S. at 625 (quoting Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 771). 
Nevertheless, "compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be 
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analyzed for alcohol content" plainly constitute searches and seizures 
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68. 
Therefore, a warrant is required unless an exception to the general 
warrant requirement applies. Schmerber itself, which carves out 
such an exception, controls this case. 
Schmerber was charged with driving under the influence. 
Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 758. His blood was drawn without his consent, 
and Schmerber objected to its admission on various constitutional 
grounds. i£. at 759. All were ultimately rejected by the Supreme 
Court. 2$i. at 760 (due process) , 765 (self-incrimination), 766 (right 
to counsel), 772 (unlawful searches and seizures). 
In concluding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the 
Court relied upon four main factors: (1) probable cause existed to 
arrest Schmerber, and he was in fact arrested; (2) a blood test was 
likely to produce evidence of intoxication; (3) dissipation of blood 
alcohol created an exigent circumstance; and (4) the blood draw was 
performed in a reasonable manner, id- at 768-72. 
Defendant concedes factors (1) , (2) , and (4), arguing only that 
the circumstances here were not sufficiently exigent tc permit the 
officer to proceed without a warrant. Br. Aplt. at 26. 
Although no Utah case addresses this precise issue, many courts 
have held that dissipation of alcohol from a suspect's bloodstream, 
without more, establishes exigent circumstances in the context of 
drunk driving, £££, e.g.. United States Y, Rgjfl, 929 F.2d 990, 994 
(4th Cir. 1991) (exigent circumstances were established by societal 
interest in protecting against drunk drivers, use of less intrusive 
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breathalyzer test, and urgency when testing for alcohol) ; Carleton 
v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 890, 891 (Cal. App. 1985), (societal 
interest in obtaining blood samples as soon as possible creates 
"emergency"); State v. Baker. 502 A.2d 489, 493 (Me. 1985) ("[t]he 
bodily process that eliminates alcohol also provides exigent 
circumstances obviating the need to obtain a warrant prior to 
administering a blood test") ; Gregg v. State. 374 So.2d 1301, 1303-04 
(Miss. 1979) (dissipation of blood alcohol constituted an "emergency," 
which, coupled with a lawful arrest, permitted police to test 
suspect's blood without a warrant); State v. Bohling. 494 N.W.2d 
399, 4 02 (Wis. 1993) ("the dissipation of alcohol from a person's 
blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a 
warrantless blood draw"), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 836 (1993). 
This rule recognizes that, unlike a suspect's blood type, see 
State v. Carter. 370 S.E.2d 553, 556 (N.C. 1988), or HIV status, 
see Barlow v. Ground. 943 F.2d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, 
denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992) , evidence of a suspect's blood alcohol 
concentration is evanescent. Nor can police secure the premises 
in order to freeze the status quo while a warrant is sought. See 
Seaura v. United States. 468 U.S. 796 (1984) . The clock keeps 
ticking. Indeed, the circumstances in a case of this type are even 
more exigent than in the usual destruction-of-evidence cases, "since 
alcohol in a suspect's blood is certain to disappear" whereas 
ordinarily physical evidence is "only very likely to disappear while 
a search warrant [is] obtained." State v. Cocio. 709 P.2d 1336, 
1345 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc). 
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Underlying policy interests strongly support such a per se rule 
in drunk driving cases. "Drunk driving is a grave problem in society 
today." United States v. Reid. 929 F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir. 1991). 
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly lamented the tragedy. " South Dakota 
v. Neville. 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983) . "No one can seriously dispute 
the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the states • interest 
in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related deaths and 
mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion." Michigan State Police 
Yt SitS, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990). 
Conversely, "the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not 
significant, since such tests are a commonplace in these days of 
periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that 
the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that tot most people 
the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. " Skinner. 
489 U.S. at 624 (quoting Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 771). 
Finally, "[d]elay in obtaining a blood sample also creates 
potential problems for drunk-driving defendants. " Bohlina. 494 N.W.2d 
at 406. This is so because "a person's [blood alcohol] level 
initially rises for a period of time after drinking stops while 
alcohol is being absorbed." Id. 
In sum, defendant's intoxicated state, and the consequent 
inexorable dissipation of blood alcohol evidence, without more, 
satisfies Schmerber's exigency requirement.13 
13
 An additional but not required factor was also present 
here. Where a search occurs in the suspected drunk driver's 
home, "an important factor to be considered when determining 
(continued...) 
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B. This Court has repeatedly refused to require the State 
to show unavailability of a telephonic warrant in order 
to establish exigent circumstances. 
Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred in finding exigent 
circumstances absent proof that a telephonic warrant was unavailable. 
Br. Aplt. at 38. Defendant cites no cases, and the State is aware 
of none, holding that the unavailability of a telephonic warrant 
is necessary to a finding of exigency in drunk driving case.14 
13(. . .continued) 
whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying 
offense for which the arrest is being made.11 Welsh v. Wisconsin. 
466 U.S. 740, 758 (1984) (warrantless home entry to obtain 
evidence of noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no 
imprisonment is possible was unreasonable). Accord Citv of Orem 
v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1392 (Utah App. 1994) (warrantless home 
entry to obtain evidence of driving under the influence, a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment and fine, was reasonable). 
Defendant here was suspected of driving under the influence 
and, if the accident victim died, automobile homicide (R. 419-20, 
430, 436) . 
14
 Defendant cites numerous federal cases to the effect that 
exigent circumstances will not be found absent a good faith 
attempt to obtain a telephonic warrant. Br. Aplt. at 35. These 
cases differ from the case at bar in critical ways: none involves 
a blood test, an intoxicated driver, or a homicide; none 
discusses Schmerber: and all rely on rule 41(c)(2), Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. £££ United States v. Tarazon. 989 F.2d 
1045, 1050 (9 Cir.) (drug search of auto service 
establishment), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 853 (1993); United States 
v. Talkinaton. 843 F.2d 1041,1047 (7th Cir. 1988) (search of home 
for counterfeit money); United States v. Manfredi. 722 F.2d 519, 
522 (9th Cir. 1983) (drug search of hotel room); United States v. 
fcerisli, 710 F.2d 1035, 1038 (5th Cir.) (drug search of mobile 
home), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 899 (1983); United States v. 
Cuaron. 700 F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983) (drug search of a 
residence); United States V. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1147 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (weapons search of apartment). 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court cited two of the 
foregoing cases, Manfredi and McEachin. for the proposition that 
••proof of the unavailability of a telephone warrant is not 
required when the exigency is so immediate or great that it 
(continued...) 
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In Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), this 
Court rejected the telephonic warrant requirement for which defendant 
argues. Henrie was convicted of driving under the influence and 
leaving the scene of an accident. Henrie, 868 P. 2d at 1385. Police 
found her car at a fourplex with front-end damage, parked at an 
extreme angle with the door ajar, and smelling strongly of alcohol. 
Id. Officers entered Henrie1 s apartment, administered field sobriety 
tests, and attempted without success to administer an intoxilyzer 
test. Id- at 1386. Henrie attempted to suppress all evidence 
gathered by police after entering her apartment. Id- at 1386 n.3. 
In affirming the trial court's finding of exigent circumstances, 
the Henrie court found that w[t]he police were properly concerned 
about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the possible loss or 
corruption of that evidence; time is critical in obtaining evidence 
of blood or breath alcohol level; the offense in question was serious 
in nature, punishable by incarceration and a fine; [and] the police 
acted reasonably and conducted a model, continuous, and ongoing 
investigation ..." Id- at 1393. Additional factors cited by the 
Court related to the fact that Henrie fled the scene of an accident 
into her home, where the search in question occurred. See id. 
Henrie argued that "police could have obtained telephonic warrant 
'in minutes' and therefore should have done so." Id. at 1392. She 
argued further that police had two hours in which to obtain the 
14
 (.. .continued) 
precludes recourse to any warrant procedures." State v. Ashe,745 
P.2d 1255, 1267 n.61 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
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warrant, relying on the statutory presumption that a blood test taken 
within two hours of an accident indicates the suspect's blood alcohol 
level at the time of the accident. I£. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44 (a) (i) (1993)) . The Court read this argument as a suggestion 
•'that the police were required to exhaust the two hours in procuring 
a warrant." I£. at 1392-93. This is defendant's argument here. 
This Court rejected Henrie's suggestion. While conceding that 
"the police could have sought a telephonic warrant within that first 
hour," the Court reiterated that it had "previously declined the 
invitation to require a showing of inability to obtain a telephonic 
warrant in addition to a demonstration of exigent circumstances." 
Id. at 1393 (citing State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 n.l (Utah 
App. 1991)). See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) .15 
15
 Ashe involved evidence discovered by the police who, 
after kicking in the door of a drug suspect's residence, secured 
the home while obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 1257. Ashe 
argued that "the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress since no attempt was made by the officers to obtain a 
telephone warrant." Id- at 1267. The supreme court wrote: 
While we do not decide whether the prosecution has the 
burden of proving the unavailability of a state 
telephone warrant in order to demonstrate sufficient 
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search, 
numerous federal cases hold that proof of the 
unavailability of a telephone warrant is not required 
when the exigency is so immediate or great that it 
precludes recourse to any warrant procedures. 
Id- The court upheld the search. Because the police "had 
substantial cause to believe that destruction of evidence would 
occur before they could obtain a search warrant," the court 
wrote, "the time required to obtain a telephone warrant, however 
brief, was not available." Id. 
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The Henrie court stressed that "where investigations of alcohol-
related offenses involve a search or arrest in a defendant's home, 
courts have been more reluctant to find exigent circumstances, 
particularly if the alcohol-related offense is minor.w Id. at 1389. 
In contrast, the instant case did not involve a home search. And 
in comparison to the misdemeanor at issue in Henrie. the offense --
a potential second degree felony automobile homicide -- certainly 
was not minor. Accordingly, under Henrie. the State was a fortiori 
not required to establish the unavailability of a warrant. 
Other courts agree that, in a Schmerber-type factual setting, 
the existence of a telephonic warrant procedure "does not alter the 
exigency of the situation." EfiisL 929 F.2d at 993; Carlton, 216 
Cal. Rptr. at 891 (over dissent arguing for telephonic warrant, see 
216 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (Staniforth, Acting P.J., dissenting)); 
Bohlina. 494 N.W.2d at 399, 404 (over dissent arguing for telephonic 
warrant, see 494 N.W.2d at 408 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)). 
In view of Henrie and precedents from other jurisdictions 
involving non-residential drunk driving searches, the trial court 
correctly analed that proof of the unavailability of a telephonic 
warrant was not necessary to a finding of exigent circumstances. 
C The two-hour presumption and the .08 legal limit are 
irrelevant to this case. 
Defendant argues in effect that his own extreme drunkenness, 
coupled with the two-hour statutory presumption, defeats the courtf s 
finding of exigent circumstances. His argument proceeds as follows: 
(1) the law forbids a person to drive with a blood alcohol level 
40 
of .08 or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after driving, sge Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(1) (a) (i) (1993) ;16 (2) 
defendant was so obviously drunk (his blood alcohol level turned 
out to be .27) that, given the rate at which alcohol metabolizes, 
there was no danger that it would drop below .08 in two hours; (3) 
defendant was arrested 30 minutes into the two-hour window; therefore, 
(4) the state had sufficient time, 90 minutes, to obtain a search 
warrant. Br. Aplt. at 28-38. This argument proceeds on a number 
of faulty premises. 
First, it assumes that degrees of drunkenness over the legal 
limit of .08 did not matter at trial. This is incorrect. 
In order to convict defendant of a second degree felony as 
charged, the State was required to prove both that defendant was 
driving while legally intoxicated and that he was "operating the 
motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner." Utah Code Ann* 
§ 76-5-207(2) (a) (Supp. 1993). Sea also Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103 (4) 
(1990) (defining criminal negligence) . The jury was also instructed 
on the elements of third degree felony automobile homicide (R. 204-06, 
214, 217) . The crime is identical except that the requisite mental 
state is simple, rather than criminal, negligence. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (a) (Supp. 1993). 
16
 A test taken more than two hours later "is admissible as 
evidence of the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the 
time of the alleged [driving], but the trier of fact shall 
determine what weight is given to the result of the test." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1993). 
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The outcome of this case lay in the gap between simple and 
criminal negligence. Defense counsel argued to the jury, "I'm not 
going to try to tell you that Paul Bredehof t was not simply negligent. 
He may have been simply negligent. But if you do not find that he 
was criminal negligent . . . then you must look to the lower offenses" 
(R. 1916-17). Prosecutors relied on the degree of defendant's 
drunkenness as evidence of criminal negligence in arguing the case 
to the jury: wthe jury instructions tell you that level of 
intoxication is something you can consider in considering criminal 
negligence. And someone who was two and a half times the legal limit 
in terms of blood alcohol is certainly something that should be 
considered" (R. 1919) . The jury was also instructed "that you may 
consider the degree of the defendant's intoxication or the amount 
of alcohol consumed by the defendant as factors in determining whether 
the defendant was criminally negligent ..." (R. 211). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1990). 
Thus, not merely the fact that defendant was intoxicated, but 
also the degree of his intoxication, was crucial at trial. 
Second, defendant's argument misreads section 41-6-44 (1) (a) (i) 
(1993) (see addendum A) . Defendant "seems to suggest that the police 
were required to exhaust the two hours in procuring a warrant." 
Henrie. 868 P.2d 1393. As noted above, this Court has already 
rejected this reading of the statute. A "more compelling 
interpretation of the statutory scheme is that it evinces the 
Legislature's intent to-promote the rapid attainment of chemical 
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tests for alcohol content," since "tests given more than two hours 
after an incident may be afforded different weight, presumably less, 
than those administered within two hours." Id- 1393 n.10. Thus, 
the two-hour window is intended to expedite, not delay, blood tests.17 
Third, defendant's assertion that "a telephonic warrant could 
have been obtained in the 90 minutes that Trooper Peterson had after 
placing Mr. Bredehoft under arrest," Br. Aplt. at 38, relies on a 
misreading of State v. Lopez. 676 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant claims that in Lopez "it took only 24 minutes to obtain 
a telephonic search warrant." Br. Aplt. at 32-33. However, a careful 
reading of the case suggests that 24 minutes was in fact the time 
spent on the telephone with the magistrate.18 The period between 
when the police developed probable cause (4:00 p.m.) and when they 
called the magistrate (5:40 p.m.) was an hour and forty minutes. 
Lopez at 395. The entire process thus consumed two hours and four 
minutes. Accordingly, to the extent that Lopez bears on the instant 
The two-hour presumption may serve other purposes as 
well. Without it, a defendant might argue that a blood test 
taken one hour after driving showed an erroneously high blood 
alcohol level on the theory that he drove so soon after drinking 
that the alcohol had not yet reached his blood stream. 
18
 This reading is confirmed by the fact that the court 
cited the 24-minute figure to supports its prediction that 
neither magistrates nor "[b]usy prosecutors and law enforcement 
personnel11 would overuse the telephonic warrant process, "since 
the added formalities, including recording and transcription, 
will require added time . . ." L2E££# 676 P.2d at 397; see also 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Utah 1987) (noting that 
obtaining a telephonic warrant requires more than "a simple phone 
call" and "can take significant time"). 
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case, it demonstrates that obtaining a warrant within the statutory 
two-hour period was not possible,19 
* * * 
In view of the foregoing, the trial court correctly determined 
that the dissipation of defendant » s blood alcohol created an exigency 
justifying a warrantless search. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S SECTION 77-17-13 CHALLENGE TO DR. RAY 
MIDDLBTON'S TESTIMONY IS NOT PRESERVED BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS BELOW DID NOT CLEARLY AND SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY 
THAT GROUND 
Defendant objected to the testimony of two different expert 
witnesses; only one is at issue on appeal. 
Trooper Zdunich. Defendant objected to the testimony of Trooper 
Zdunich on the ground that he had not received 30-days notice of 
the testimony as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1990) (R. 
1093, 1101) . Prosecutors proffered that Trooper Zdunich would testify 
as to "the effects of alcohol on human physiology; that is, how it 
impairs a person's ability to function well and drive a motor vehicle" 
(R. 1095). Defendant's objection was taken under advisement (R. 
1111-12) and Trooper Zdunich did not testify in the prosecution case 
in chief. 
19
 In view of the foregoing discussion, defendant's claim 
that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the blood draw 
occurred at 8:20 p.m. rather than 8:18 p.m.# Br. Aplt. at 27-28, 
is irrelevant. 
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The trooper was allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness in 
response to defense testimony (R. 1827) . Trooper Zdunich testified 
that a blood alcohol level of .27 will impair judgment, coordination, 
and balance; lower inhibitions; increase risk-taking; cause blurred 
or double vision; slow the system; and causes fatigue, vomiting, 
and incontinence (R. 1844-46). Defendant does not contest this 
testimony on appeal. See Br. Aplt. at 39-43. 
Dr. Middleton. On appeal, defendant attacks the admission of 
the testimony of Dr. Raymond Middleton, a physician. He argues that 
Dr. Middleton1 s testimony concerning the effect of a .27 blood alcohol 
level should have been excluded under section 77-17-13, which requires 
3 0-days advance notice before calling expert witnesses. See Br. 
Aplt. at 39, 43. However, because defendant failed to articulate 
that ground for his objection at trial, this issue is not preserved 
for appellate review. 
In order to show defendant's grossly negligent state of mind, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1990) , the prosecution called Dr. 
Middleton, who teaches about the effects of alcohol use in the 
Dayspring Program, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program defendant 
attended in 1987 (R. 1236-40). 
Dr. Middleton testified concerning his 44-lecture Dayspring 
seminar, including the effects of alcohol on the nervous system and 
on coordination (R. 1242-49) . In the course of this testimony, Dr. 
Middleton testified that the fine motor coordination of a person 
with a blood alcohol content of .27 would be very much impaired, 
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and that many people would be approaching a comatose state (R. 124 8) . 
Dr. Middleton also testified that, as part of his program, he covers 
the effects of alcohol upon a person, including, from time to time, 
examples based on different alcohol levels (R. 1249) . 
Defendant objected repeatedly to Dr. Middleton's testimony 
concerning the effects of a .27 blood alcohol level (R. 1245-50, 
addendum E). For example: 
Q (By Mr. Ybarra) The next question would be, then, 
what would you anticipate the effect of such a concentration 
upon a person's coordination? 
MR. MICKELSON: Objection, your Honor, again rule on 
expert witnesses. 
THE COURT: This is not an expert witness as such. 
This is asking based upon the qualification, experience, 
and expertise that this individual possesses and it does 
not fall within --
MR. MICKELSON: They [sic] it goes to foundation, then, 
as to ability of this witness to testify as an expert -
expert in that area, the effects of alcohol on the system 
with that kind of level of blood alcohol. 
THE COURT: If it's just a foundation objection, then, 
I think that foundation has been established . . . any other 
objection? 
MR. MICKELSON: Is the State's motion to move to have 
him qualified as an expert in this area? 
THE COURT: I haven't heard anything in [sic] that 
extent. 
MR. MICKELSON: There's still lack of qualifying this 
witness as an expert before we can proceed in this area. 
THE COURT: In some jurisdictions there may be a need 
to have a witness to be designated as such and have the 
court accept them. In this jurisdiction it's based upon 
the training qualification. I would inform the jury they're 
not bound by any testimony and it's dependent upon what 
they consider the.educational requirements, experience, 
et cetera of a witness to either accept or reject their 
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testimony. And that would be my instruction to the jury 
at the appropriate time. 
MR. MICKELSON: Thank you, your Honor. Again I renew 
my objection, again, under the rules on expert witnesses, 
and I believe they have crossed the line on that area, would 
ask the Court to follow the statute on expert witnesses 
at this point. 
THE COURT: I understand. Thank you- And as I 
understand the proffered testimony, it's asking this 
witness's opinion regarding the effects of a BA of .27 upon 
an individual based upon his training in the area and 
experience and expertise. Is that correct, Mr. --
MR. YBARRA: That is correct. 
THE COURT: -- Ybarra? Thank you. 
MR. MICKELSON: Your Honor, as I understand that calls 
for an expert opinion at this point in time, again the £-: r.e 
THE COURT: Okay. And maybe you have misunderstood 
me, Mr. Mickelson. It's not necessary for the State to 
ask me to accredit or to designate anybody as an expert 
witness. That will be part of the instructions that I am 
going to give to the jury, and it's going to be up to the 
jury as to whether or not they accept that person, based 
on foundation or not. 
I have ruled that foundation is established. And it's 
not necessary for the State to request of me, nor is it 
necessary for me to designate this witness or any other 
witness to be an expert. 
MR. MICKELSON: I understand t.\ - , your Honor, and I 
accept that part of it. At this point in time they are 
moving over into the expert opinion area with this witness 
and he was not designated as an expert witness to testify 
on the effects of --
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. 
(R. 1245-47). At no point during Dr. Middleton's testimony did 
defense counsel cite section 7-17-13, mention the 30-day time limit, 
claim surprise, or otherwise clarify the basis of his objection. 
His cryptic references to the "statute on experts" or the "rule on 
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expert witnesses" suggest that he may have been thinking of section 
77-17-13 as he objected. However, it is clear from the court's 
responses that it never understood the objections to rely on the 
notice requirements of section 77-17-13. Rather, the court reasonably 
understood defendant's objections to go to foundation or to the 
failure to "designate" Dr. Middleton as an expert. 
The trial court was not being obtuse. When counsel objected 
to a subsequent witness's testimony on the ground that the 
"prosecution failed to disclose they were getting in this line of 
questioning with their witness" (R. 1369) , the trial court correctly 
understood the objection as grounded upon section 77-17-13, 
paraphrasing it as follows: "Mr. Mickelson, the basis for your 
objection is that in the attempt of the State to comply with the 
expert witness notice requirement, they did not put down that Sergeant 
Middaugh is going to be testifying as to the effects of alcohol upon 
someone" (1372) . In fact, the trial court sustained this objection, 
ruling that the prosecutor could not question the witness "as to 
the effects of alcohol of a B.A. level of .27 upon an individual" 
(R. 1376-77) .20 
"Trial counsel must state clearly and specifically all grounds 
for objection." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 13363 n.12 (Utah 
1993) (emphasis added). Otherwise, "that issue is not properly 
preserved for appeal." Id- &2£££d In re Estate Of Jwetheim, 824 
2
 The trial court overruled a similar objection raised by 
the State against defendant's accident reconstructionist (R. 
1712-13). 
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P.2d 432, 434-35 (Utah App. 1991) ("[i]n order to complain of the 
admission of evidence, there must be a clear and definite objection 
stating the grounds therefor"). The objection must "be specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of the very error11 complained 
of. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co. . 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah 
App. 1996) (emphasis added) (quoting Beehive Medical Elec. Inc. 
v- Square DCo.. 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)). 
"The purpose of requiring a properly presented objection is 
to 'put the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the 
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the 
proceedings.1" State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Brobercr v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) (per 
curiam)). 
Trial counsel's objections here did not afford the trial court 
that opportunity. They did not identify clearly and specifically 
"the very error" complained of on appeal: that the State had failed 
to give defendant notice of the challenged testimony as required 
by section 77-17-13. Accordingly, this claim of error is not 
preserved and the issue is not properly before this Court.21 
21
 The challenged testimony was cumulative in any event. In 
addition to the testimony of Trooper Zdunich summarized above, 
Trooper Peterson testified to the characteristics of persons with 
a .27 blood alcohol content (R. 1259-60). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ^ - gjgjgSnib'er 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
)ROS, 
sistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
32A-12-103. Criminal responsibility for conduct of an-
other. 
In addition to Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2 of the Utah Criminal Code relating 
to criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, the following principles 
apply to violations of this title: 
(1) If a violation of this title is committed by any person in the employ 
of the occupant of any premises in which the offense is committed, or by 
any person who is required by the occupant to be or remain in or upon the 
premises, or to act in any way for the occupant, the occupant is prima facie 
considered a party to the offense committed, and is liable as a principal 
offender, notwithstanding the fact that the offense was committed by a 
person who is not proved to have committed it under or by the direction of 
the occupant Nothing in this section relieves the person actually commit-
ting the offense from liability. 
(2) If a violation of this title is committed by a corporation or associa-
tion, the officer or agent of the corporation or association in charge of the 
premises in which the offense is committed is prima facie considered a 
party to the offense committed, and is personally liable to the penalties 
prescribed for the offense as a principal offender. Nothing in this section 
relieves the corporation or association or the person who actually commit-
ted the offense from liability. 
32A-12-204. Unlawful sale or supply to intoxicated per-
sons. 
A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply any 
alcoholic beverage or product to any person who is apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or to a person 
whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should have 
known from the circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alco-
holic beverages or products or drugs. 
82A-14-101. Liability for injuries resulting from distribu-
tion of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action — 
Statute of limitations — Employee protections. 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or at a 
location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the 
Mowing persons, and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, 
is liable for injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third 
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from 
the intoxication: 
(a) any person under the age of 21 years; 
(b) any person who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating 
alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; 
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew 
or should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs; or 
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person. 
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of this 
chapter* 
(3) A person who suffers an iiyury under Subsection (1) has a cause of action 
against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of 
Subsection (1). 
(4) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights 
or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate. 
(5) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person 
pursuant to a cause of action under thi* chapter that arises after July 1,1985 
ii limited to $100,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all 
persons injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $300,000. 
(6) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be 
commenced within two years after the date of the injury. 
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the iiyury, 
(8) (a) A sanction or termination of employment may not be imposed upon 
any employee of any restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise 
beer retailer, or any other establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a 
result of the employee having exercised the employee's independent 
judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person the employee 
considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection (1). 
(b) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on 
the employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated 
against that employee and is sufcgect to the conditions and penalties set 
forth in Title 34, Chapter 35, the Utah Antidiacriminatory Act 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if 
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that 
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, •negligent" means simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and 
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if 
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that 
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent 
manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means 
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify 
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, 
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing 
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten 
days before the hearing. Notice shall include the name and address of the 
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed 
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not 
adequately inform concerning the substance of thr expert's proposed 
testimony including any opinion and the bases u d reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing 
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient 
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the 
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when 
available. 
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party 
receiving notice shall provide notice to the other party of witnesses whom the 
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name 
and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If 
available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal 
expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform 
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the 
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal 
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated 
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to 
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any 
rebuttal expert when available. 
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this 
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or 
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. If the court finds 
that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the part 
of any party or attorney; the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. 
77-23-4. Examination of complainant and witnesses — 
Witness not in physical presence of magistrate — 
Duplicate original warrants — Return. 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the absence of an 
affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony of a 
person who is not in the physical presence of the magistrate provided the 
magistrate is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the war-
rant The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by 
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and transcribed. 
After transcription, the statement shall be certified by the magistrate and 
filed with the court This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for 
purposes of this section. 
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursu-
ant to Subsection (2) shall be those required by this chapter. Prior to 
issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall require the law enforcement 
officer or the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the warrant to read 
to him verbatim the contents of the warrant. The magistrate may direct 
that specific modifications be made in the warrant. Upon approval, the 
magistrate shall direct the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting 
attorney for the government who is requesting the warrant to sign the 
magistrate's name on the warrant. This warrant shall be called a dupli-
cate original warrant and shall be deemed a warrant for purposes of this 
chapter. In such cases the magistrate shall cause to be made an original 
warrant The magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the 
duplicate original warrant on the face of the original warrant. 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the original warrant 
shall be in conformity with this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate 
shall require the person who gave the sworn oral testimony establishing 
the grounds for issuance of the warrant to sign a copy of the transcript. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentra-
tion — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol 
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without war-
rant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of 
license — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehi-
cle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily 
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily rea-
sonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes any similar local 
ordinance adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first convic-
tion, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more 
than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work pro-
gram, the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational aeries at a licensed alcohol or dirug dependency reha-
bilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1,1993, the court may 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a prob-
lem condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction lor a violation committed within six years 
of a prior violation under this section the court shall as part of any sen-
tence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive 
hours nor more than 720 hours. 
(b) Hie court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to work 
in a commimity-eervice work program for not less than 80 hours nor more 
than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment and edu-
cational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two 
prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and 
(7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for 
violations committed after April 23, 1990. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impoee a mandatory Jail sentence of not leas than 720 nor more than 
2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-eervice work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-eervice work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court ahall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-eervice work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the pro-
gram provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term 
closely supervised follow through after the treatment 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-eervice work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony 
if at least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 
23, 1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours 
nor mors than 2,160 hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
eentenec. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drag dependency 
rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if the program pro-
vides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow through after the treatment 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court ahall order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section 
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole 
or probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been 
served. Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation 
under this section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or re-
voked as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, 
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after 
July 1, 1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilita-
tion costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the convic-
tion is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner 
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior violations commit-
ted after July 1, 1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4)9 (6), (6), and (7) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug de-
pendency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the court, 
treatment at an alcohol or urug dependency rehabilitation facility; 
obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things, apply to 
a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior 
conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) H e court shall render the same order regarding education or 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under Sub-
section (10), as the court would render in connection with applying 
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements 
of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous 
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a 
prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to 
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted 
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) Tlie statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-645 as follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest 
to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for 
the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation, the 
resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec-
tions (5), (6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), knd 
(7). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the 
operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsec-
tion (1), and shall revoke far one year the license of any person convicted 
of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is commit-
ted within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation 
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended 
under Section 41*2*130, if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions 
for driving under the influence — Weight of evi-
dence. 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material 
to prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical 
test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evi-
dence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 
does not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged 
driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of 
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating 
or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is 
given to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissi-
ble evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at 
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control. 
Addendum B 
"7 
JAMES D. MICKELSON, Ho. 4375
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Attorney for Defendant 
215 South State, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL GUY BREDEBOFT, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
BLOOD SAMPLES AND 
RESULTS 
Case No. 941900500 FS 
Judge Glenn X. Iwasaki 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Paul Guy Bredehoft, by and through 
his attorney of record, James D. Mickelson, and moves this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-(12) of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, to suppress all evidence regarding the blood 
samples, an any and all evidence results regarding the analyzing 
of blood taken from the Defendant for purposes of determining 
alcohol and/or drug content concentration by the Plaintiff, 
through its agents and associates. 
This motion is made on the grounds that all evidence that the 
Defendant request be suppressed was obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and art. 1 Sec. 14 of 
000117 
the Utah States Constitution, in that the arresting officer, 
Trooper Peterson, did not have consent or other lawful 
justifications for taking the blood of the Defendant and having it 
analyzed. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
The facts will be presented to the Court by oral testimony of 
the subpoenaed witnesses. 
POIWTS Jjflp AUTHORITIES 
POZHT Z 
THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OP ESTABLISHING THAT THE SEARCH OP 
THE DEFENDANT HAS LAWFUL. 
It is a well-established principal that obtaining a blood 
sample from a Defendant is a search for purposes of Fourth 
Amendment protections. See gghjf^ rfcfr y. California. 384 U.S. 757, 
86 S Ct 1826. 
Further the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Chrlstensen. 676 
P.2d 408 (Utah 1984) has held that where no warrant has been 
issued, the state has the burden of showing that the search was 
lawful. 
POINT ZZ 
EVIDENCE OP THE BLOOD TEST AID ZTS RESULTS SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED FOR FAILURE OP THE ARRESTING OFFICER TO INFORM THE 
DEFENDANT OP THE PURPOSE AMD OIVE THE DEFENDANT AH 
OPPORTUNITY TO DECLINE THE TESTS 
In the instant case, it is the Defendant's contention that he 
was not given the opportunity to decline the talcing of blood 
-2-
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samples by Bryon Davis, of Salt Lake County, at the direction of 
the arresting Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Peterson. 
The Defendant concedes that under Utah Code Ann. Section 
41-6-44.10 that he has given implied consent to chemical tests as 
a result of operating an automobile upon the highways of the State 
of Utah so long as the test is at the direction of a police 
officer having ground to believe that the Defendant was operating 
an automobile or having a blood or breath content above the 
statutory prohibitive amount. 
However, it is the Defendant's contention that he must be 
made clearly aware that any chemical blood or breath tests is 
being taken for the purposes of investigating the suspicion of 
driving under the influence. Th*s proposition is supported in the 
case of State v. Cruz. 446 P.2d *07, 309 (Utah 1968) wherein the 
Court, in deciding the applicability of the implied consent 
statute first held that it only applies after arrest, and 
secondly, held that the arrested person is only then compelled to 
elect whether he will submit to a test or lose the license. 
In fact, under Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-44.10, the 
legislature adopted a language indicating that there must be a 
request to submit to a test by a police officer before sanctions 
apply. 
-3-
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The relevant portion of the statute is set forth in 
subsection 2(a): 
If the person has been placed under arrest has then been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of 
the chemical tests under subsection (1), and refuses to 
submit to any chemical tests requested, the person shall be 
warned by the police officer requesting the test or tests, 
that a refusal to submit to a test or tests can result in 
revocation of the persons license to operate a motor vehicle. 
The statutory scheme under 41-6-44.10 indicates that a request to 
take a test is part of the implied consent law* 
Further in Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979), the 
Court, in reviewing an issue regarding confusion over the issuance 
of Miranda rights, and the request to take a chemical test, where 
the Defendant was unclear as to his legal rights under the 
circumstances held that: 
fairness and due process require that the person threatened 
with the loss of his driver's license should be afforded an 
opportunity to make a choice on a fair explanation of his 
rights and duties. 
It is the Defendant's contention that fairness and due process 
require that the police officer not only inform the individual why 
he is under arrest, but then inform the Defendant of tests to be 
taken and request that his compliance to do so in order to avoid 
confusion as to the purposes of any tests and afford the 
opportunity to the Defendant to elect his course of conduct. 
Finally, it is the Defendant's contention that any blood 
tests taken in violation of Utah's implied consent law and its 
000120 
results must be suppressed* In State v. Annen, 504 P.2d 1400 (Or, 
App* 1973), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that it was error to 
receive evidence in a criminally negligent homicide case of the 
results of a blood test taken in violation of the consent 
provisions of the Oregon statute. 
COBCLU8IOH 
In the instant case, the Defendant respectfully submits that 
failure of the officer to give the Defendant the opportunity to 
decline the test, by informing him of the purpose of the blood 
tests being taken, was in contravention of the Utah implied 
consent statute and lacked the implied consent of the Defendant 
thus, requiring the suppression of the blood tests and its 
results. 
DATED this / day of August, 1994. 
'AAS> & M^-~ 
!S D. MICKELSON 
'Attorney for Defendant 
-5-
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CERTIFICATE OF BAND DELIVERY 
of August 1994, the undersigned sailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress Sanples and 
Results, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Xioberly X. Hornak 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City,~ Utah 84111 
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»*ar «I9IIUI«T COURT 
Thfrd Judicial District 
DAVID E . YOCOM WlG 2 0 1994 
Salt Lake County Attorney ^
 /v^  
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK, Bar No. 4341 , T ^ i ^ 
Deputy County Attorney KpufBHT 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
PAUL G. BREDEHOFT, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
RE: DEFENSE MOTIONS 
Case No. 941900500FS 
Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above-styled matter came on for hearing on August 15, 
1994 as to the following items: 
1. Defendant's motion to suppress the arrest due to lack 
of probable cause. 
2. Defendant's motion to suppress blood samples and the 
results of the blood alcohol test. 
The plaintiff. State of Utah, was represented by Kimberly K. 
Hornak. The defendant was present and represented by James 
MiekeIson. The Court reviewed the legal memoranda presented by 
both sides, considered arguments of counsel and otherwise being 
fully informed in the premises; 
WHEREFORE, the Court makes the following findings and 
conclusions: 
1. Motion to Suppress Defendant's Arrest. 
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The Court finds that under the totality of circumstances 
known to Trooper Jeff Peterson that Trooper Peterson had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant for Driving Ufader the Influence of 
Alcohol. These circumstances include the following observations 
noted by Trooper Peterson: an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, 
bloodshot eyes, staggering movements when defendant walked, lax 
facial muscles. Further, the defendant stated that he had six 
drinks that day, mostly beer. Defendant also stated that he was 
driving the red mustang. 
Under the appropriate legal standard stated in Lavton Citv 
v. Noon, 736 P.2dl035 (Utah App. 1987), the facts known to 
Trooper Peterson were such that a reasonable person in his place 
would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed 
the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
Therefore, Trooper Peterson had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant. 
2. Motion to Suppress Blood Samples and Results. 
The Court finds that defendant has been charged with 
Automobile Homicide, Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-207. Subsection 
(6) of that section provides that "evidence of a defendant's 
blood • •. alcohol content ... is admissible except when 
prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution." Utah Code 
Ann. Section 41-6-44.5(1)(b) contains similar language. It 
states that *[i)n a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with 
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Section 41-6-44•10 [the implied consent statute] does not render 
the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a 
defendant's blood ... alcohol content ... is admissible except 
when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution." 
The Courts finds that evidence of the defendant's blood 
alcohol content should only be excluded if its admission violates 
the rules of evidence or the corstitution. The Court finds that 
under Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 668 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1984) that 
destruction of blood alcohol evidence can constitute an exigent 
circumstance and thus, an exception to the Fourth Amendment 
requiring a search warrant before evidence is taken. Further, 
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.5(2) provides for a presumption that a 
blood alcohol test is valid if taken within 2 hours of the 
defendant's control of the vehicle. The Court finds that in the 
instant case the collision occurred at 7:35 p.n;. and that 
defendant's blood was taken at 8:20, one hour into the two hour 
presumtion of a valid blood alcohol content. 
The Court finds that under Citv of Orem v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 
1384 (Utah App. 1994) the officer is not required to show an 
inability to obtain a telephonic search warrant in addition to a 
demonstration of exigent circumstances. 
The Court finds that in this case Trooper Jeff Peterson was 
properly concerned about the dissipation of blood alcohol and the 
possible loss or corruption of that evidence, that time was 
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critical in obtaining evidence of blood alcohol level, that the 
offense was serious and that the exigent circumstances obviated 
the need to obtain a search warrant. Further, that there was no 
evidence before the Court that a magistrate with the proper 
equipment as required by Utah law was available and prepared to 
do a telephonic search warrant. 
Jafaes MiekeIson " 
lMI©i7?: 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings, Conclusions And Order 
Re: Defense Motions was delivered to James Mickelson, Attorney 
for Defendant Paul G. Bredehoft, at 215 South State Street Suite 
800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 
,39 day of August, 1994. 
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTatG*Judicial Dtitnrt 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH QPJ \ $ |996 
STATE OF UTAHf t FINDINGS OF FACT * — Sputy i 
FROM RULE 23B BEARING 
t 
P l a i n t i f f , CASE NO. 941900500FS 
t CASE NO. 940724-CA 
vs. 
I 
PAUL G. BRXDEHOFT, 
I 
JUdge Glenn X. Iwasaki 
Defendant. t 
In September 1994, following a jury trial, defendant was 
convicted of criminal automobile homicide, a second degree felony. 
On appeal, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. The 
matter comes before the Court pursuant to an August 12, 1996 order 
of the Utah Court of Appeals (Judge Oxme). The order remands the 
case pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B(c), which permits the 
appellate court to 'order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel/ 
The proceedings in this court are governed by rule 23B(e), 
which provides: 
Upon remand the trial court shall conduct hearings and 
take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact 
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Evidentiary hearings shall be 
conducted without a jury and as soon as practical after 
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the 
proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a 
preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall 
enter written findings of fact. 
According to the Court of Appeals' order, the limited scope of 
the hearing is to examine 
(1) whether counsel's business Interests affected 
counsel's performance in failing to explore offering 
defendant's testimony in a possible criminal action 
against counsel or his businesses in exchange for 
leniency in the criminal action; and (2) whether 
counsel's business interests affected his decision to 
call defendant to testify at trial that he was not 
impaired. 
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The Court conducted a bearing on the natter on October 2, 
1996. Defendant was represented by Richard P. Mauro and Robert K. 
Heineman. The State was represented by Rodwicke Ybarra. The 
defendant's only witness was James D. Mickelson, defendant's trial 
counsel. The State did not call a witness. 
With this background, the Court makes the following findings 
of fact [page numbers refer to the hearing transcript]: 
1. In March 1994, defendant was charged with automobile homicide. 
2. James D. Mickelson acted as defendant's defense attorney from 
the beginning of the action, through the preliminary hearing, 
and through trial. He has been licensed to practice law in 
Utah for twelve years, [p.5,72] 
3. Mickelson has stayed abreast of recent developments in how to 
defend people charged with alcoholic beverage offenses, 
[p.73] 
4. Charley's Club, Inc. and Uncle Bart's (collectively "the 
clubs") are private clubs that serve alcohol. [p.6,11] By 
law, they are not-for-profit entities, [p.56] 
5. While Mickelson was representing defendant, Mickelson served 
as the registered agent, an officer (treasurer), and a member 
of the "Governing Board of Trustees" of both of the clubs. 
[p.7,exh. 1-3] As of the date of the hearing, Mickelson still 
served in these positions, [p.58] 
6. The clubs are managed by and pay management fees to Club 
Management, Inc., a for-profit entity. While Mickelson was 
representing defendant, Mickelson was an officer, director, 
registered agent, and 50% owner of Club Management, Inc. 
[p.7-8,40,58,exh. 4-5] As of the date of the hearing, he 
still served in these positions, [p.58]. 
7. Club Management, Inc. owns all of the physical assets used in 
the operation of the clubs, with the exception of the 
consumable, personal property (e.g. the liquor, food), [p.€2] 
8. The clubs? and Club Management, Inc.'s other officers and 
trustees were Mickelson's father, mother, sister, and then-
wife, [p.10-14] 
9. The clubs' and Club Management, Inc. are the sole livelihood 
for Mickelson's parents. [p.114] Mickelson received no 
direct money from these entities, but may have received 
attorney's fees for services he performed for the entities. 
[p.7.23,114] 
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10. Mlckelson and defendant had known each other on both a social 
and business level for about 15 years prior to the trial. 
They were on a first-name basis. Mlckelson represented 
defendant in the mid-1980's on a DUI matter in Tooele County. 
Defendant had worked sporadically as a janitor and handyman 
for the clubs. Ip.65-66,70,115] 
11. For twelve years, Mlckelson's law practice has involved 
putting together corporations for private clubs. During that 
time, he has become well acquainted with Utah's Dram Shop Act. 
[p.14-15] 
12. The parents of the individual who was hit and killed by 
defendant's car filed a civil action in November 1994. 
[p.l7,exh. 6] Initially Mlckelson was individually named as 
a defendant, but was later dismissed out of the case prior to 
its going to trial, [p.20] 
13. Mlckelson has served as an attorney for the clubs and Club 
Management, Inc. and has advised these entities on various 
issues, [p.22] However, he did not represent these entities 
in the civil action filed against them relating to the car 
accident, [p.32,52] 
14. During his representation of defendant, Mlckelson was not 
aware of Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-103, entitled "Criminal 
responsibility for conduct of another." [p.23-25] 
15. During his representation of defendant, Mlckelson was aware of 
the following: 
a. the concept of comparative negligence, [p.26] 
b. that the clubs faced potential liability under the Dram 
Shop Act, including the possibility of punitive damages, 
[p.26) 
c. that defendant could be liable for special, general, and 
punitive damages, [p.27] 
d. that Utah's automobile homicide statute is two-tiered: 
it provides for a second-degree felony, requiring a 
higher degree of culpability, and a third-degree felony, 
requiring a lesser degree of culpability, [p.28-30] 
e. that evidence generated at and the issues discussed at 
the criminal trial would be used at the civil trial. 
[p.36) 
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f. that in a subsequent civil suit, the clubs1 attorneys 
would be loyal to the clubs1 interests and seek to limit 
the clubs1 liability, [p.37] 
g. that there was a question about how much defendant had 
had to drink the,day of the accident, [p.53] 
16. Soon after defendant's arrest, and at the request of a mutual 
friend, Mickelson went to the jail to see defendant. They 
talked about the charges generally and arranged for 
defendant's personal affairs. Mickelson told him that he 
could face a civil action. There was no talk of any possible 
conflicts or waivers. Ip.30-31] 
17. Mickelson did not at any time disclose any possible conflicts 
to any magistrate, judge, or prosecutor. Ip.32-33,39-40] 
18. Mickelson spoke privately with defendant about Mickelson1s 
potential conflicts of interest on two occasions. No written 
waiver was ever prepared, [p.34]. 
19. The first occasion occurred sometime in March 1994, following 
their initial meeting and prior to the preliminary hearing. 
It took place at the jail. Mickelson brought up the subject.. 
Only Mickelson and defendant were present. Mickelson did not 
take any notes in that meeting. [p.34-35,38,70] Mickelson 
told defendant: 
a. that if there were a civil action and if both the clubs 
and defendant were named as defendants, there would be a 
clear, actual conflict of interest, [p.38,44] 
b. that he, Mickelson, did not believe that there was a 
conflict in the criminal case because Mickelson did not 
see any criminal liability on the part of the clubs, 
[p.39,47] 
c. that there was a possibility that because of the 
potential conflict in the civil case, Mickelson might 
unconsciously do something or not do something that would 
affect his representation of defendant* [p.39,47] 
d. that he, Mickelson, would be loyal to defendant and that 
he did not think his. association with the clubs would 
affect his representation of defendant, [p.39] 
e. that defendant might want to have the issue reviewed by 
another attorney, [p.47] 
20. At some paint, defendant considered hiring Ron Yengich to 
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represent him, but decided to stay with Mickelson. [p.47-48] 
21. Defendant knew Mickelson and his family members were involved 
in running the clubs because defendant had done work for the 
clubs before, [p.38,68] 
22. The second occasion Mickelson and defendant discussed the 
conflicts was more lengthy than the first. It occurred during 
the summer of 1994. In preparation, Mickelson had reviewed 
the Rules of Professional Conduct and discussed the conflict 
issue with several attorneys in his office. Mickelson 
brought up the subject. [p.34-35,39,48-49] Mickelson 
explained to defendant: 
a. that there may be a potential conflict if both the clubs 
and defendant were named in the civil action. 
b. that, because of the conflict, Mickelson would not 
represent either defendant or the clubs in the civil 
action. 
c. that the prosecutors had not indicated any desire to file 
criminal charges against the clubs. 
d. that there was a possibility that Mickelson's decisions 
may be affected unconsciously by the conflict. 
e. that Mickelson would present the best possible defense 
for defendant without any concern for what effect it may 
have on the clubs, [p.50-51] 
23. Mickelson took notes on this second occasion. However, these 
notes could not be located for the hearing. Following the 
trial, Mickelson turned over all of the materials related to 
defendant's case to the Legal Defender Association. The 
materials were later returned to Mickelson. In preparation 
for the hearing, Mickelson searched the returned materials but 
was unable to locate the notes, [p.34-35,39,48-49,87-89,118-
19] 
24. Both times after Mickelson brought up the potential conflicts, 
defendant did not express any surprise or concern and merely 
trusted and expressed confidence in Mickelson to represent 
defendant's interests. Defendant asked Mickelson to continue 
to represent him. [p.€9-70,72] 
25. Throughout his representation of defendant, and even after the 
trial began, Mickelson attempted to obtain a plea bargain for 
defendant. Because of the seriousness of the offense charged, 
the defendant's numerous prior DUI convictions, and the great 
002129 
STATE v. BREDEHOFT PAGE 6 FINDINGS OF FACT 
public interest in the case, the prosecutors would not offer 
a plea bargain and indicated that they would only allow 
defendant to plea to the charged count, [p.41,79-85] 
26. Mickelson did not talk to the prosecutors about having 
defendant testify as to misconduct by the clubs or the clubs' 
employees in exchange for a plea bargain. [p.41-42] 
Mickelson was unaware of any case where such a situation had 
occurred, [p.76,78] 
27. The clubs admitted that defendant had been in the clubs on the 
date of the accident. The bartenders at the clubs both 
testified that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated 
while he was at the clubs, [p.42,50] 
28. Mickelson testified- -unrebutted by any other evidence or 
testimony--that had he received any evidence that there was 
any conduct on the part of the clubs that would have benefited 
defendant, Mickelson would have immediately withdrawn from 
defendant's case. [p.42] 
29. Defendant's criminal trial lasted six or seven days. 
Defendant took the stand. Bis testimony on direct examination 
comprised 6X pages of trial transcript. On direct 
examination, there was no mention that he had been drinking at 
the clubs. [p.55,57] 
30. Mickelson and defendant's strategy in having defendant testify 
was to pursue the defense of a sudden emergency, i.e. that 
there was an emergency situation that caused defendant to take 
the actions he took, thereby lowering the normal standard of 
care. Defendant had indicated to Mickelson that another 
vehicle had forced him into the emergency lane. None of the 
other eye witnesses testified to this fact at trial. Other 
than having defendant testify, there was no other way to get 
that information to the jury and to have that defense 
submitted to the jury by way of a jury instruction, [p.103-
08] 
31. Before defendant took the stand, Mickelson explained to 
defendant how the prosecutor would likely cross-examine 
defendant. Defendant agreed to go on the stand, [p.108-09]. 
32. On cross-examination, defendant testified where he had been 
drinking the day of the accident. If defendant had not 
testified during the trial, the clubs' identities would not 
have come up at trial, [p.ill] 
33. Bad defendant offered a plea bargain before trial to have 
defendant testify against the clubs, defendant would have had 
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to identify the clubs, [p.112-13] 
34. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant whether 
he felt intoxicated at the time of the accident, [p.109] 
35. After the trial, Mickelson advised defendant that it was not 
appropriate for any trial attorney to represent a criminal 
defendant on appeal and that he should obtain new appellate 
counsel, [p.122-23] 
36. In the civil trial, punitive damages were assessed against the 
clubs. These damages are not covered by insurance and will be 
paid by the clubs^ [p.59,115] 
Dated this. 
V-^ ?'*«LENN K. IWASAKI 
'0-*^.^STRICT COURT JUDGE 
A S\ *i « ,». 
Case No: 941900500 FS 
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1 Q Now, have you received specialized training with 
2 regard to the effect of alcohol at various concentrations 
3 of a person's system? 
4 A Other than specific medical school training based 
5 on 30-odd years of practice and 16 years of practice in 
6 the substance abuse field, I'm certified by the America 
7 Society of Addiction Medicine. 
8 Q Now, you are familiar, are you not, with regard 
9 to a measurement of blood alcohol content of weight per 
10 volume, are you not? 
11 A Tes, sir. 
12 Q And you're aware of the legal standard for 
13 driving a motor vehicle being not greater than .08; are 
14 you not? 
15 A That's correct. 
16 Q Would you be familiar with a concentration of 
17 alcohol, the meaning of a concentration of alcohol of .27? 
18 A That to me ~ 
19 Q Weight per volume? 
20 A That to me would be a highly intoxicated 
21 individual. 
22 MR. MICKELSON: Objection. 
23 THE COURTS The question was are you familiar 
24 with it, "yea" or "no." 
25 Sustained. 
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1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am familiar with that. 
2 THE COURTt And I'm sorry and I may have 
3 interrupted. What was your answer, •yes" or "no"? 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am familiar with that level. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. 
€ Q (By Mr. Ybarra) The next question would be, 
7 then, what would you anticipate the effect of such a 
8 concentration upon a person's coordination? 
9 MR. MICKELSON: Objection, your Honor, again rule 
10 on expert witnesses. 
11 THE COURT: This is not an expert witness as 
12 such. This is asking based upon the qualification, 
13 experience, and expertise that this individual possesses 
14 and it does not fall within ~ 
15 MR. MICKELSON: They it goes to foundation, then, 
16 as to ability of this witness to testify as an expert ~ 
17 expert in that area, the effects of alcohol on the system 
18 with that kind of level of blood alcohol. 
19 THE COURT: If it's just a foundation objection, 
20 then, I think that foundation has been established by his 
21 experience, especially his education, his years in the 
22 substance abuse areas since 1978, his duties as director 
23 of — medical director and instructor in the Dayspring 
24 alcohol treatment program, the fact that he has been 
25 giving these lectures for 10 years or thereabouts if 
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1 that's — any other objection? 
2 HR. MICKELSON: Is the State's motion to move to 
3 have him qualified as an expert in this area? 
4 THE COURT: I haven't heard anything in that 
5 extent. 
6 MR. MICKELSONi There's still lack of qualifying 
7 this witness as an expert before we can proceed in this 
8 area• 
9 THE COURT: In some jurisdictions there may be a 
10 need to have a witness to be designated as such and have 
11 the court accept them. In this jurisdiction it's based 
12 upon the training qualification. I would inform the jury 
13 they're not bound by any testimony and it's dependent upon 
14 what they consider the educational requirements, 
15 experience, et cetera of a witness to either accept or 
16 reject their testimony. And that would be my instruction 
17 to the jury at the appropriate ^ime. 
18 MR. MICKELSON: Thank you, your Honor. Again I 
19 renew my objection, again, under the rules on expert 
20 witnesses, and I believe they have crossed the line on 
21 that area, would ask the Court to follow the statute on 
22 expert witnesses at this point. 
23 THE COURT: I understand. Thank you. And as I 
24 understand the proffered testimony, it's asking this 
25 witness's opinion regarding the effects of a BA of .27 
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1 upon an individual based upon his training in the area and 
2 experience and expertise. Is that correct, Mr. — 
3 MR. TBARRA* That is correct. 
4 THE COURTi ~ Tbarra? Thank you. 
5 MR. MICKELSONs Tour Honor, as I understand that 
€ calls for an expert opinion at this point in time, again 
7 the State — 
8 THE COURTS Okay. And maybe you have 
9 misunderstood me, Mr. Mickelson. It's not necessary for 
10 the State to ask me to accredit or to designate anybody as 
11 an expert witness. That will be part of the instructions 
12 that I am going to give to the jury, and it's going to be 
13 up to the jury as to whether or not they accept that 
14 person, based on foundation or not. 
15 I have ruled that foundation is established. And 
16 it's not necessary for the State to request of me, nor is 
17 it necessary for me to designate this witness or any other 
18 witness to be an expert. 
19 MR. MICKELSON: I understand that, your Honor, 
20 and X accept that part of It* At this point in time they 
21 are moving over into the expert opinion area with this 
22 witness and he was not designated as an expert witness to 
23 testify on the effects of — 
24 THE COURTi Tour objection is noted. 
25 Q (By Mr. Tbarra) Do you recollect the question as 
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1 His Honor restated it? 
2 A I think the question was do I think this was a 
3 level of intoxication that would impair coordination, 
4 Q Well, could you tell us what would be the effect 
5 of someone with .27 blood alcohol content? 
6 A His coordination would certainly be affected. 
7 For many individuals they would be approaching comatose 
8 state at .27. 
9 Q And what would be his ability with regard to fine 
10 motor coordination. 
11 A Very much impaired. 
12 Q And his ability to be aware of things that go on 
13 around him? 
14 MR. MICKELSON: Again, your Honor, objection as 
15 to — 
16 THE COURT: Qualified expert witnesses? 
17 Thank you for objecting. That give me an 
18 opportunity to further clarify my ruling. 
19 I am ruling that this is attendant to his 
20 previous testimony, that he does tell people and instructs 
21 people as to the effects of alcohol upon a person. Wasn't 
22 that your previous testimony? 
23 THE WITNESS! Yes, sir. 
24 THE COURTS And let me ask some questions of you 
25 then. Dr. Kiddle ton. And in that regard, do you also tell 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 283 
n n i 2 4 8 
1 them what kinds of effects they would have upon them as 
2 you indicated, coordination, et cetera? 
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
4 THE COURTS And that is part of your program, is 
5 it not? 
6 THE WITNESSt Yes, sir. 
7 THE COURTt And do you also take examples as to 
8 different amounts of alcohol that could affect people when 
9 you teach them? 
10 THE WITNESSs From time to time we do that. 
11 THE COURTS And did you from time to time, during 
12 1987, to your recollection do that? 
13 THE WITNESSs From time to time, yeah. 
14 THE COURTS Thank you. 
15 MR. MICXELSONs Tour Honor, let me make this a 
16 continuing objection at this point again. I have no 
17 problem with what he instructed people at various times in 
18 1987. But as to opinions, as to persons with a certain 
19 level of alcohol in their system, I'm going to make that 
20 continuing objection. Any questions along that line 
21 requires his opinion, then I will — my objection is --
22 before I make a continuing objection on the failure to 
23 follow the statute on expert witnesses. 
24 THE COURTS Didn't you just hear the questions I 
25 asked Dr. Middleton and those answers? Those topics are 
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1 included in his lectures, including his opinion, which he 
2 has to give to someone when he is lecturing them as to the 
3 effects of alcohol. 
4 MR. KICKELSON: As long as he understand it's 
5 opinion he gives to someone during that lecture. The 
6 question here was his opinion as to somebody with that 
7 level. 
8 THE COURTS And as I explained, that was all part 
9 and parcel of his process that he explained to people 
10 through his lectures. 
11 Q (By Mr. Tbarra) Dr. Middleton, do you feel like 
12 you fully answered that question as far as reasonably — 
13 A Yes, sir, I do. 
14 MR. TBARRA: Then I have no further questions at 
15 this time. 
16 THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
17 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. MICRELSONx 
19 Q Dr. Middleton, you indicated that in 1987 that 
20 what you instructed patients at that time would change 
21 from various times to time; is that correct? 
22 A Basically, no. Basically what I teach is on this 
23 chart. Sometimes if there's some new information ~ 
24 certainly in 10 years there's been new information on 
25 alcoholism — that's added to it, but there's still the 
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